[Unbound-users] [DNSSEC] Resolver behavior with broken DS records
wouter at NLnetLabs.nl
Sat May 7 08:13:34 UTC 2011
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
On 05/06/2011 04:09 PM, Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
> In an (involuntary) experiment under .FR, I discovered that the rule
> "at least one DS must match for a child zone to be authenticated" is
> wrong if a broken DS is present. In our case, the field Algorithm in
> the DS did not match the one in the DNSKEY. While there was another
> correct DS for the child zone, Unbound 1.4.6 servfails. So, the
> incorrect DS made the child zone bogus.
This should not happen, can you send me details, the DS records involved
(and perhaps the DNSKEY records) ? They are of the same algorithm, I
Are you sure the other was correct? If it was SHA1, then it could have
been ignored if the other was SHA256 (as per RFC). Unbound only reports
the last error it encounters, it might have checked two but reported the
> If there are DS and that one of them is dangling (going to an
> unexisting key) or unknown (new algorithm), Unbound validates if there
> is at least one DS it can process.
Yes that was the plan.
> I won't discuss the legality of this behaviour (my reading of the RFC
> on this point is that a resolver can do what it wants) but I believe
> that the current Unbound behaviour is:
> * inconsistent: Unbound uses a "at least one DS" policy when there are
> dangling DS but a "all the DS" when there are broken DS.
> * dangerous: a simple mistake in one of the DS will make the zone
It is certainly not what we want.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v2.0.15 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with SUSE - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
More information about the Unbound-users