[RPKI] Improvements in RPKI ensuring backward compatibility - Would be possible?

Douglas Fischer fischerdouglas at gmail.com
Mon Mar 1 11:46:47 UTC 2021

I recently sent this email(below) to the NLNetLabs RPKI list.

And I was recommended to bring this topic to sidrops.

I am not yet familiar with the M.O. of this community, so I apologize and
accept guidance for any inappropriate behavior.

I am concerned to keep the healthy use of RTBH viable...
I know that this is not the best mechanism to solve problems with DDoS and
But in practice, it ends up being the most cost-effective tool for the
operator of the ASN itself that is being targeted by what I call "silly
attacks" to react and evade those attacks.

The purpose of this email is to present two possibilities that I have been
imagining for some time as good measures for RPKI.

Note: As I know that I am locked in the point of view of those who only see
the positive side of an idea ... I am open to seeing the negative side of
these ideas.

1 - Increase the levels, officially in the protocol, the status of a route
based on the RPKI, Specially of Invalid Status.
In the email below, this concept is reasonably well described.
I kindly ask you to read this detail below.

This is already possible to implement today if the protocol is "sliced" a
little, but it needs to be done using specific ROA validator engines, and
it needs to be done on a host that allows you to execute specific code,
which prevents this from being natively implemented and standard routers on
the market.

The idea is to give the ASN operator the autonomy to decide (on
routing-filter policies) what to do with some route, based on the detailed
RPKI status of that route.

P.S .: I have observed that other initiatives are inclined to go the same
way of further analyzing the status of the Route based on ROA. Unless
mistaken, there are discussions about this in projects involving some
Route-Server used by several IXPs to improve Police-Filtering of RTBH.

2 - Add the possibility of using the "minimum prefix length" attribute in
With that, I believe that the reality of the routes generated by the ASNs
would be better represented. In addition to allowing ROAs exclusively
created for RTBH and the like to be created.

Ex.1: An organization with an IPv4 / 16 block will rarely advertise this
block only with a single route. Whether for geographic reasons or for
routing strategy, it will probably advertise this in / 18-20 block.
Ex.2 .: This same organization may want to tell the world that Routes
originated by its own ASN, or by ASNs of scrubing companies, of the prefix
of this / 16 with the mask "LE 32" "GE 32" are valid.

Thanks in advance for your patience and comprehension.

Douglas Fernando Fischer
Engº de Controle e Automação

---------- Forwarded message ---------
De: Douglas Fischer <fischerdouglas at gmail.com>
Date: ter., 23 de fev. de 2021 às 08:14
Subject: IETF draft - The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
To: <rpki at lists.nlnetlabs.nl>

I don't know if this is the best forum to discuss this ...
If not, I apologize.

So far I was not aware of this draft, which already has 6 versions, and is
heading towards the final version.


As far as I could understand, the main reason for proposing this draft is
to enable a safe and fast way to make the security of the RPKI origin
validation also include the cases of RTBH ads that are generally of unique
IPs (/ 32 or / 128 ).

Honestly, so far I am undecided as to whether this is the best methodology
for such a solution.

Until now I was adopting (especially for route-servers) the methodology of
further analyzing the possible status of RPKI.
- Valid -> complements do not fit
- Unknown -> complements do not fit
- Invalid -> by previous ROA Date
- Invalid -> by Later ROA Date
- Invalid -> by ASN of Origin
- Invalid -> for less specific mask
- Invalid -> by more specific mask

Thus, in the route filtering tests received against Blackhole I was using
the following logic:

If (is into AS-SET My-Customer) and \
   (has Black-Hole-Community) and \
   ((is IPv4 and is /32) or (is IPv6 and is /128)) and \
   ((is RPKI Valid) or (is RPKI unknow) or (is RPKI invalid by mas more
specific)) then \
   accept as Blackhole...

P.S.: This is a very summarized way to express the logic... I had to do
some gymnastics to implement it... Converting RPKI JSONs belonging to each
AS-SET to Prefix-lists.

So I would like to hear from other colleagues about this Draft, and it will
change the way every ASN should filter RPKI, specially RTBH.

Douglas Fernando Fischer
Engº de Controle e Automação
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